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This paper discusses the nature of (post)-human and (post)-natural worlds by 
examining the types of entities responsible for knowledge production in contemporary 
technoscience. Based upon a case study in high energy physics and a constructive 
critical engagement with actor-network thought in science studies and geography, a 
complex trinity of geographically relevant actants is developed and discussed as a 
conceptual resource for studying geographies of human-environment relations 
beyond reductionist dualisms such as subject/object, nature/society and human/non-
human. At the heart of the suggested trinity of actants lies the notion of ‘dynamic 
hybrids’ that identifies humans, other organisms and certain machines as decisive 
nodes between material and immaterial spaces of scientific network-building. The 
paper concludes by assessing how the suggested conceptual moves may affect the 
analysis and critique of scientific practice. It is pointed out that the proposed 
conceptual resources are not trying to establish new boundaries in order to 
contribute to a better understanding of science and its varying geographies, but to 
keep the categories we use in motion. 
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In the symmetry between humans and nonhumans, I keep constant the series of 
competences, of properties, that agents are able to swap by overlapping with one 
another. (Latour 1999b: 182) 
 
Introduction 
Over time many concepts have been developed about how humans position 
themselves within the known world. In the traditional Judeo-Christian view, for 
example, humans are autonomous from and superior to the natural world, and central 
to creation. As part of a God-Nature-Human trinity, they are entitled to help God ‘in 
finishing the task of creation’ (Jordon-Bychkov and Domosh 2002: 95), thus 
justifying a massive environmental transformation and the construction of all sorts of 
(bio)technologies that increasingly challenge traditional Human-Nature binaries. 
Quite different imaginations of and attitudes to human-environment interactions are 
implied by animistic and organic world views, which regard people as a part of and at 
harmony with nature but also allow for the possibility of what William Smole (1976: 
23) phrased as an ‘easy transmutability […] between what [we] commonly define as 
different realms: the human, natural, and divine.’  
Such world views share common ground with recent works in science studies 
and geography that try to make sense of the diverse boundary-crossings, hybridities 
and contingencies produced by the rapidly expanding practices of the sciences and 
experienced in all spheres of everyday life (see, for example, Haraway 1997; Latour 
1999b; Whatmore 2002). These studies often deal with conceptual resources 
developed in the wider context of actor-network theory (ANT), which emerged from 
sociological and anthropological studies of scientific practice in the 1980s and has 
substantially contributed to shifting the focus of geographical research to the role of 
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socio-material things and non-human organisms within human practices, interaction 
and culture.
1
 
In an attempt to replace the conventional but increasingly problematic a priori 
binaries of social theory such as subject/object, nature/society, micro/macro and 
inside/outside (Latour 1996; 1999b), actor-network based works introduced the idea 
of variable ontologies into scholarly debate by regarding every entity and category as 
a temporarily stabilised result of network-building processes between heterogeneous 
entities (Latour 1992: 286). The categories of humans and non-humans, however, 
remained intact when addressing the resources and outcomes of network-building 
(see, for example, Latour 1993: 11, 134; 1999b: 304), implying what Sarah Whatmore 
(2002: 165) refers to as a ‘residual humanism’ and running the risk of becoming black 
boxes of their own. 
These observations inevitably raise two questions about conceptual ideas that 
currently inform much research in geography and other fields of the social sciences: 
Why is it that even in an approach which has repeatedly been labelled ‘anti-
humanistic’2 the category of the human is still so powerful? And – re-phrasing a 
question brought up by Noel Castree and Catherine Nash with regard to this theme 
issue – what form may conceptual resources take when one cannot readily speak of 
the ‘social’ and the ‘natural’, the ‘human’ and the ‘non-human’? 
In this paper, I would like to take up these questions by exploring recent 
practices and geographies of knowledge production in contemporary technoscience 
and by discussing their conceptual implications in the light of ANT and its contested 
history within science studies and geography. By developing the notion of ‘dynamic 
hybrids’ as nodes of scientific network-building, I would in particular like to argue 
that this concept, when seen as part of a ‘trinity of actants’, may not only contribute to 
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a better understanding of how geography matters in the production of scientific 
knowledge, a topic raised by David Livingstone’s (1995; 2002; 2003) outline of a 
geography of science, but may also help to gain a sense of conceptual orientation over 
changes taking place in what has been discussed as our emerging post-human and 
post-natural worlds (see, for example, Hayles 1999, Fukuyama 2002, Castree and 
Nash 2004). 
In a recent exchange on the meaning of interdisciplinary debates about ‘post-
humanism’ for geographical discourse and practice (see Badmington 2004, Braun 
2004, Castree and Nash 2004, Murdoch 2004, Whatmore 2004), Noel Castree and 
Catherine Nash identified three prominent lines of argument. According to their 
review, the first line of argument, exemplified by Francis Fukuyama (2002), regards 
the post-human as an ‘historical condition’ in which non-human technology-based 
beings would dominate the human realm in the long-term. The second line of 
discussion sees post-humanism ‘as a set of ontological theses about the human that 
never was and will never be’ (Castree and Nash 2004: 1342), which is a discourse that 
applies Bruno Latour’s (1993) argument ‘We have never been modern’ (and thus have 
never been post-modern) to similar debates on nature and the human. The third line of 
post-humanist thinking, practised, for example, by Neil Badmington (2004), could be 
understood as a ‘“both/and” form of deconstructive reading’ that ‘takes the form of a 
ceaseless scepticism about the claims made in the name of either the human or its 
notional transcendence’ (Castree and Nash 2004: 1342). 
Against this background, the following remarks subscribe to an analytical-
philosophical position that builds upon actor-network-based ideas of gradual, 
unpredictable shifts in power-relations between non-human nature, humans and 
technologies (Latour 1993; 1999b). While following Sarah Whatmore’s (2002; 2004: 
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1361) call for ‘more-than-human’ geographies, it applies a form of critically 
constructive reading to both conceptual debates and empirical realities by exploring 
how a geographical perspective on recent developments in technoscience might 
contribute to conceptual resources that overcome restrictions imposed by 
conventional binaries of social theory. On these grounds it is assumed that post-
humanist thinking prepares neither for ‘the end’ of humans nor for ‘the end’ of 
suggesting conceptual resources that might help to make sense of human-environment 
relations in different times and places. My motivation for exploring such conceptual 
resources is in fact based on Bruno Latour’s (1999c: 24) call for continuing to 
develop ANT’s ‘strange potential’ in a collective endeavour. It can also be regarded 
as an attempt to tie in with Noel Castree’s (1995: 41) recommendation ‘to dissect the 
complexity’ of the category ‘nature,’ and ‘to develop a more sophisticated [...] 
vocabulary’ for dealing with issues of materiality and knowledge production in 
geographical research. 
 
Argumentation 
The first part of the paper briefly sketches one possible reading of ANT and its history 
within science studies in order to provide the background for the conceptual moves 
suggested in the third part of the paper. While it is well known that actor-network 
thought is a heterogeneous, ever-evolving and contested project that has been 
developed and elaborated in quite different ways by Michael Callon, Bruno Latour 
and John Law since the mid-1980s (see, for example, Callon 1986; Callon, Law and 
Rip 1986; Law 1986a; 1994; Law and Hassard 1999; Latour 1987; 1993; 1999b), the 
introductory remarks concentrate on a particular exchange between David Bloor and 
Bruno Latour that specifically deals with the geographically significant question of 
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how nature, society, knowledge and technology can be understood and how they are 
interrelated (Bloor 1999a; 1999b; Latour 1999a). By positioning both empirical 
findings and conceptual reflections within the Bloor-Latour debate, I would like to 
suggest that their arguments appear in a quite different light when placing a 
geographical perspective on scientific practice and interaction.  
Interested in the meaning of space within the process of knowledge production, 
such a geographical perspective is applied in the second part of the paper, which 
examines recent practices and geographies in the field of high energy physics. The 
presented case study was chosen from a larger project on the geographies of different 
scientific practices, in which I interviewed 85 US researchers from across the sciences 
and the humanities in order to gain a better understanding of their travel and 
collaborative cultures (Jöns 2003). In this paper, the focus is on high energy physics 
as this is a well documented and rapidly changing branch of the technosciences (see, 
for example, Crane 1971; Traweek 1988; Krige 1993; Knorr Cetina 1999). By 
constructing and using sophisticated technologies in order to extend humans’ sensory 
perception to times and spaces that would otherwise remain inaccessible, high energy 
physicists profoundly challenge familiar understandings of space, agency and other 
basic categories of social theory such as ‘nature,’ ‘human,’ and even ‘god,’ a fact that 
has strongly contributed to the impression of an emerging post-human, post-natural 
and post-divine world in the twentieth first century. 
The third part of the paper translates the empirical findings into theory by 
reflecting upon the meaning of the ‘human’ and the ‘non-human’ in high energy 
physics. Based upon a constructive critical engagement with the Bloor-Latour debate, 
comments on actor-network thought by other science students and the empirical 
findings, it is argued that ANT’s proclaimed conceptual symmetry between human 
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and non-human ‘actants’ leads to some blind spots in the analysis of network-building 
processes. Alternatively, the notions of ‘dynamic hybrids’ and a ‘trinity of actants’ are 
developed and put up for discussion. The paper closes with addressing some of the 
ways in which the proposed conceptual moves may affect the analysis and critique of 
scientific practice and human-environment interactions more generally, thus building 
a bridge to the other contributions in this theme issue. 
 
The Bloor-Latour debate 
The idea that geography matters in the production of scientific knowledge began to 
take shape in the 1970s when science studies questioned an immanent universality of 
scientific content by arguing that knowledge reflects various social interests of those 
who propose it (Barnes 1998: 205). Up to that point, truth about natural reality was 
regarded as being self-explanatory and not influenced by the social environment, 
whilst false beliefs were explained by social factors that could only hinder scientific 
inquiry (Merton 1942; see also Latour 1993: 92). 
Among those who first rejected this rationalist approach to science, were the 
followers of the Edinburgh school of social constructivism (Barnes 1974; Bloor 
1976). Based on empirical case studies, David Bloor argued that ‘[b]oth true and 
false, and rational and irrational ideas, in as far as they are collectively held, should all 
equally be the object of sociological curiosity, and should all be explained by 
reference to the same kinds of cause’ (Bloor 1999a: 84). By explaining shared beliefs 
about nature on the basis of this so-called ‘symmetry postulate’, the role of social 
interests and requirements for the production of scientific knowledge became the 
centre of interest of a sociology of scientific knowledge. 
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Since the late 1980s, actor-network theorists have promoted an alternative 
approach to the project pursued by social constructivism (see, for example, Latour and 
Woolgar 1986; Latour 1987; 1993). Although they emphasise that it overcomes the 
epistemologists’ asymmetrical approach of explaining falsehood with social factors 
and truth by natural reality, Bruno Latour accuses this ‘first principle of symmetry’ of 
also being asymmetrical, because ‘it brackets off Nature and makes the ‘Society’ pole 
carry the full weight of explanation’ (Latour 1993: 94).  
Instead of trying to explain nature in terms of society, society in terms of nature, 
or knowledge as a mixture, actor-network based approaches conceptualise scientific 
practice as a network-building process between heterogeneous entities and thus reject 
all a priori binaries. Scientists, research objects, technical infrastructure, sponsors and 
all other human and non-human entities involved in scientific practice are regarded as 
being outcomes and mediators of network-building and thus, as human agency is 
extended to things, are equally considered to be ‘actants’. 
ANT suggests following or reconstructing network-building processes between 
different actants in order to trace their connections and to understand the stabilisation 
process and variable ontologies of the emerging categories, scientific black boxes and 
new actants (Latour 1987; 1996). By arguing that humans and non-humans should be 
treated symmetrically in such an undertaking, ANT’s much-quoted ‘generalised 
principle of symmetry’ (Callon 1986: 200f) directed the main focus towards the role 
of previous neglected socio-material things needed to construct and stabilise scientific 
knowledge and other ‘social’ structures.3 
In the course of the last two decades a strong opposition between social 
constructivist and actor-network based approaches to science has developed which 
has culminated in an exchange between two main advocates, David Bloor and Bruno 
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Latour, on the meaning of knowledge, nature and society for scientific work (Bloor 
1999a; 1999b; Latour 1999a). While both agree on arguing against rationalist and 
natural realist positions, Latour criticises social constructivists for not being interested 
in the role of objects for knowledge production. He wonders how social interests and 
requirements could arbitrarily produce biology, chemistry and the cosmic order 
(Latour 1993, 55), and argues that ‘the Edinburgh daredevils deprived the dualists – 
and indeed themselves [...] – of half of their resources’ (Latour 1993: 55).  
In turn, Bloor misses the role of shared, institutionalised and other forms of 
knowledge within ANT. He replies: ‘[T]hroughout the entire discussion, Latour 
makes no systematic distinction between nature and beliefs about, or accounts of, 
nature. [...] It is as if he has difficulty telling these two things apart’ (Bloor 1999a: 
87). Steven Shapin pointed in a similar direction when identifying the paradox that 
Latour’s account of technoscience displays ‘a world in which anything and anybody 
can be an actant or an actor, where we may […] speak of texts but not people as 
having independent interests’ (Shapin 1988: 547). 
Comparing these arguments reveals that actor-network thought introduced new 
explanatory resources to science studies by looking at the ways in which socio-
material things act upon humans. However, its strong rejection of social 
constructivism has been mutually linked with the neglect of explanatory resources 
pivotal to this approach, namely social interests, mindsets, goals, feelings and 
knowledge. These are as much invested in scientific practice as money, collaborators, 
research objects and infrastructure (Shapin 1988: 543) and thus are actants 
themselves.  
Against this background, I would like to show that the types of explanatory 
resources stressed in each approach imply different geographies of scientific practice 
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and thus should all be considered in order to account for the meaning of space in 
scientific work. What this means for conceptual resources that go beyond the 
human/non-human binary will eventually become clear after discussing the empirical 
example of recent practices and geographies in high energy physics. 
 
Creating new spaces 
The field of high energy physics originated in the first half of the twentieth century 
when researchers began to study nuclear reactions and the structure of new-found 
particles with the help of linear and circular particle accelerators (Knorr Cetina 1999: 
159-166). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, large particle accelerators 
achieving high energy levels can be found in about seventy places (Frommberger 
2005). Half of these facilities are located in Europe, including the Centre Européen 
pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) at Geneva, which is the world’s largest particle 
physics laboratory today (CERN 2004). 
In the early 1990s, a major change in the history and geography of high energy 
physics was triggered by the development and construction of the Relativistic Heavy 
Ion Collider (RHIC) at the Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island, New 
York. This particle accelerator, which began operation in 2000, comprises of two 
counter-circulating rings with a circumference of 3.8 km, enclosed in a tunnel about 
four meters underground. At the rings’ intersection points, the nuclei of heavy atoms 
such as gold are smashed together at nearly the speed of light, primarily to create a 
form of matter, the so-called quark-gluon plasma, that is supposed to have existed ten 
millionths of a second after the Big Bang, i.e. at the dawn of our universe, about 13.7 
billion years ago (NASA 2004, BNL 2004). While constructing a post-natural world 
par excellence when colliding particle beams inside the RHIC tunnel, the physicists’ 
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ambitious practices of re-modelling what comes close to the act of the known world’s 
(probable) creation, begin to blur the boundaries between what has been 
conventionally designated as the separate domains of Gods and Humans.  
In their efforts to generate new data and knowledge about the origins of our 
universe, RHIC physicists rely on four highly developed particle detectors that Sharon 
Traweek (1988: 17) considers to be ‘the key informants’ of such a study (figure 1). 
Located at the points where the two rings of accelerating magnets intersect, these 
huge detectors are able to witness and record the events performed by colliding 
particle beams and to translate the fleeting signals of sub-atomic interactions into a 
scale and language accessible to humans. Extending the researchers’ senses to 
extremely small, dense, short-lived and hot physical spaces,
4 
this extraordinary 
mediation is only possible by combining basic human characteristics such as the 
materiality of the human body with the skills of observation, translation and 
representation. By using detecting elements, memory devices and powerful computers 
to pursue their ascribed tasks, the particle detectors incorporate what could be 
regarded as a post-human version of an embodied mind. Thus, they are resembling 
what I will later conceptualise as ‘dynamic hybrids’, i.e. entities who are able to 
actively negotiate between the realms of matter and meaning because their abilities 
are based on a dynamic combination of both. 
Figure 1 about here 
The individuality of those four detectors operating at RHIC results from 
different strategies of their constructors, manifested in the language and skills they 
were taught and in the quality of their constituting socio-material networks (Traweek 
1988). Accordingly, these detectors form the nodes of four competing collaborative 
experiments named STAR, PHENIX, PHOBOS and BRAHMS. Praised in a press 
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release as a ‘nice example demonstrating that science has no borders’ (AIP and APS 
2000), a closer look at the collaborative patterns of about 1,000 researchers working 
in 100 institutions across eighteen countries reveals distinct spaces of exclusion, co-
operation and competition (figure 2a). Excluding those people, institutions and places 
that cannot afford what Bruno Latour (1987: 179) described as the ‘expensive proof 
race of the sciences,’ the few regional clusters of participating institutions mirror a 
30-year-long history of interaction within the specialised field of relativistic heavy ion 
physics. 
 
Forming networks 
The field of relativistic heavy ion physics started in the early 1970s when the 
BEVATRON, the former synchrotron at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
(LBL), was converted to the BEVELAC in order to accelerate heavy ions at two 
orders of magnitude higher energy than previously possible (Westfall 2003). The 
machine’s conversion attracted researchers from Germany and from Japan who were 
hosted by two different research groups at the BEVELAC, thus forming two different 
collaborative networks in the 1970s.  
Since that time, the field’s centre of activity has shifted in accordance with the 
emergence of new facilities operating in ever higher energy ranges, namely from the 
BEVELAC to the CERN in the mid-1980s and from the CERN to the RHIC in the 
late 1990s. A comparison of the geographies of the participating institutions in the 
large experiments conducted at CERN in the early 1990s and at RHIC in the late 
1990s reveals, first, how the experimental networks became ever more transnationally 
organised, at least within the Northern Hemisphere (figure 2). This development is 
mainly related to the experiments’ ever-expanding complexity and costs requiring 
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more and more people with different expertise as well as increasing financial 
contributions from national governments and other sources. Other influencing factors 
are the fields’ growing history and popularity based on scientific results that are at the 
cutting edge of the sciences. 
Figure 2 about here 
Secondly, the changing geographies of scientific collaboration highlight the 
lasting importance of regional clusters next to the research facility and – as the 
examples of India, China, Korea and Japan concisely illustrate – of national clusters 
in competing experiments, primarily for reasons of funding, accessibility, research 
styles and personal ties. According to one of my interviewees, the Japanese cluster of 
participating institutions in the PHENIX experiment can be attributed to the initiative 
of a single researcher by the name of Shoji Nagamiya. Nagamiya worked at the 
BEVELAC for a couple of years, became a professor at Columbia University and 
eventually went back to Tokyo University. As one of the proposers and a former 
spokesperson of what became the PHENIX experiment, he interested a large number 
of Japanese scientists in RHIC physics, while his home country ‘invested about 20 
million dollars into particular equipment at RHIC and formed a [PHENIX] analysis-
computing centre in Japan’ [Interview 82]. 
Thirdly, these mappings support the experience of the first BEVELAC director 
that ‘the groups of collaborators formed at one accelerator tend to stay together even 
when they move to different experiments’ [Interview 39]. The Americans with him in 
CERN experiment NA49, that is UCLA and Seattle, are also in the STAR 
experiment. The same is true for the group of his long-term collaborator Reinhard 
Stock from the University of Frankfurt, who initiated the German-American 
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collaboration at the BEVELAC with a visit to Berkeley in the mid-seventies and later 
became the spokesperson of CERN experiment NA49.  
By increasing the mutual trust necessary for the development of working 
routines and an open, scientifically rewarding exchange of ideas and materials, the 
history of shared experiences, practices and responsibilities in high energy 
experiments has contributed to the formation of relatively stable collaborative 
networks that are working together to find new phenomena against the other 
collaborations, while continually reproducing themselves: 
 
They persist for a long time these things… People recommend their students 
and post docs to their collaborators and this is the network that keeps on going. 
[Interview 39] 
 
Accordingly, the Japanese-American network in the PHENIX experiment at RHIC is 
somewhat separate from the German-American network in the STAR experiment, and 
– as the former BEVELAC director illustratively put it – ‘there’s been no crossing 
over between them’ [Interview 39]. While the STAR collaboration at RHIC gave 
credit to its name because it was more or less approved as proposed by the 
collaboration centred around the LBL and other people previously engaged in the 
CERN experiment NA49, the second large experiment at RHIC, PHENIX, emerged 
out of the ashes of four proposals that originally got rejected, thus being a merger of 
collaborative networks that had been part of the CERN experiments NA44, NA45 and 
WA98. The origins of the collaboration, however, can still be identified by tracing the 
name of Shoji Nagamiya from his involvement in the Japanese-American group at the 
BEVELAC to the PHENIX experiment at RHIC. 
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While the different experimental networks expanded considerably over the 
years, the outlined genealogies of two large RHIC collaborations show that these are 
based on small and productive experienced teams, which are coherent enough to 
survive the move from one accelerator to another, thus resembling what has been 
described as invisible colleges (Solla Price 1963; Crane 1972): 
 
Our colleagues at Frankfurt and Munich together with us developed expertise 
on the time projection chamber... So there was a core that came from 
NA35/NA49, who had developed technical expertise and had an interest in a 
particular style in doing physics, and when it became time to propose STAR, 
these people came on board. [Interview 82] 
 
Localised by the corporeality of the collaborating researchers and their equipment, 
those invisible bonds and intangible actants relating to memories of previous 
encounters, personal ties, ‘a style of doing physics’, trust as well as competition shape 
the geographies of the RHIC community as much as socio-economic conditions in 
different countries and the accelerator itself (figure 2a).  
 
Negotiating (im-)materialities 
Being firmly anchored in the ground of Long Island, New York, the accelerator 
becomes an obligatory passage point at early stages of scientific network-building. 
When data on heavy ion collisions is generated, most of the collaborators travel to 
Brookhaven for the time of the experiment: 
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I probably go ten times a year or 15 times a year [to Brookhaven]… In order to 
be connected to the science you absolutely have to be there, have your hands on, 
see what’s happening. There are immediate decisions to be made: Do we 
configure the detector this way, do we configure it that way? … Every data 
taking period is different, there’s new equipment, there’s things behaving 
differently… So when the data are being taken… it’s absolutely essential to be 
there at least for a part of the time in order to really understand what’s going on. 
[Interview 82] 
 
The data analysis and the paper writing, however, are usually done at the researchers’ 
home institutions. In the form of notes, files and memories, the necessary data 
resources can easily be transferred to those places providing the basic infrastructure 
for constructing a stable interpretation out of the experimental data. Continued 
collaboration at a distance is based on the fact that the highly abstracted nth-order 
representations of experimental practices and products involved in the data analysis 
and paper writing are ontologically compatible with the virtual realm of modern 
telecommunication media and thus can be transferred back and forth electronically 
without being changed too much: 
 
Every week, on Monday at one o’clock... we have a physics analysis conference 
for about an hour... It’s always Berkeley, UCLA, Texas, Brookhaven, some of 
the East Coast institutions, I phone Sao Paulo and Calcutta; people call in from 
Birmingham; actually we have some Dutch people now… some people call in 
sometimes from Germany and occasionally I have to call someone in Russia... 
Basically, what you do is you put your results on the web and everyone can get 
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them instantly... Everyone uses the Internet, five minutes before the meeting 
they can download the figures and at the phone meeting you just say go to my 
area, there’s a new thing, and it all works fine. [Interview 82] 
 
These different forms of intense traffic between RHIC and the participating 
institutions help to maintain the comprehensive collaborative networks of knowledge 
production over large distances. They reveal that human interactions can be stabilised 
and extended through time and space in at least three ways. The first way involves the 
transfer of socio-material non-humans (immutable mobiles, quasi-objects, 
inscriptions) as stressed by actor-network based studies (see, for example, Murdoch 
1997b: 327), the second way refers to the use of memories by travellers and the third 
way represents electronic transfer of information.
5
 When thinking in terms of 
concepts, however, it is not clear how immaterial entities such as memories and 
electronically conveyed meaning, knowledge, ideas, interests, goals and feelings 
integrate into the binary concept of human and non-human actants according to which 
both should be treated symmetrically when analysing how networks are built, how 
new actants emerge and how power is distributed among different actants (Latour 
1999b: 182; figure 3). 
Figure 3 about here 
While the sketched Bloor-Latour debate indicated that the proclaimed symmetry 
of humans and non-humans does not sufficiently account for the role of knowledge 
and ideas in scientific practice, many critics of ANT have been aware of the fact that 
although ‘[m]etaphors and discourse are, of course, a vital part of scientific practice’ 
(Demeritt 1996: 489, referring to feminist critiques of ANT), the repertoire of actor-
network thought does not account for the ‘role of knowledge in linking scientists 
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together’ (Murdoch 1997a: 752, summing up different critiques). Nigel Thrift pointed 
in a similar direction by arguing that ‘actor-network theory cannot speak of certain 
things’ (Thrift 1999: 313), including aspects such as ‘emotion’, ‘memory’, and 
‘language’ (Thrift 1999: 314-316).  
Against this background, the proclaimed conceptual symmetry of human and 
nonhuman actants appears to be problematic as what is referred to as human means 
much more than what counts as non-human (figure 4). In most writings on ANT, non-
humans always seem to belong, at least partly, to the material world (see, for example, 
Latour 1993: 79, 138; Bingham 1996: 643-647). Humans, however, not only show 
this (socio)materiality, which is vividly expressed in the human body, but they are 
also able to deal with thoughts and feelings, ideas, knowledge and other memories, all 
of which have been identified in this paper – conceptually as well as empirically – as 
actants themselves. Thus, I would like to suggest that the concentration of actor-
network based science studies on the previously ignored role of matter in scientific 
work has led to the neglect of the mediating role of what could be addressed as 
mental, virtual and immaterial entities. These were mainly ‘blackboxed’ under the 
label ‘human’ but also – as the example of the translating particle detector showed – 
overlooked in parts of the non-human realm.  
Figure 4 about here 
In order to disentangle what is happening on the side of ‘humans’ and ‘non-
humans’, my first of three conceptual suggestions is, therefore, to acknowledge 
materialities and immaterialities as distinct types of actants when trying to make sense 
of scientific practice and its geographies. Since the concepts and terms at hand do not 
only shape research interests and methods in a certain time and place, but also suggest 
what counts as important and who is allowed to be heard, I do not think that it would 
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be sufficient to be content with the mere possibility of considering aspects like ideas, 
emotions and subjectivity within a diffuse set of actor-network ideas (Hitchings 
2003). In the case of mental and other immaterial actants it seems to be even more 
important to acknowledge their power conceptually, because due to their invisibility, 
they are always in danger of being ignored by the simple observer of scientific 
practice. Representing an immaterial counterpoint to socio-material non-humans, 
mental actants are necessary to transform matter into signs and to recognise the 
meaning of these signs. They themselves are collectively produced and altered in the 
course of network-building, but, as the case study in high energy physics exemplified, 
they imply different scientific geographies to their material counterparts – for 
example, in regard to invisible colleges and collaboration at a distance.  
 
Introducing dynamic hybrids 
One important way in which material and immaterial actants shape the spaces of 
science differently relates to the changing meaning of (im)materiality in the course of 
knowledge production. This process, that alters the geographies of the RHIC 
community all along, can be best described by what Bruno Latour conceptualised as 
reversible chains of transformation between an analogue world at the one extreme and 
ultimate abstraction at the other (Latour 1999b: 70-71). According to this concept of 
‘circulating reference’, scientists perform consequential mediations from matter to 
form in order to generate comprehensible and well communicable scientific claims 
about much more complex phenomena (figure 5a). As long as all steps are traceable 
in both directions, these chains tell how knowledge claims came into being and thus, 
representing Latour’s answer to basic questions of epistemology, they transport truth 
(Latour 1999b: 69). Latour points out that each mediation means a trade-off between 
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the loss of multiplicity, particularity, locality and materiality and the gain of 
standardisation, compatibility, circulation, relative universality – and what I would 
like to add – immateriality. 
Thus, following the cascade of knowledge production in the RHIC community 
from the construction of the accelerator and its detectors via the particle beams’ 
collisions, the data taking period and the modelling of the detector response to the 
data analysis, the discussion of first results and the editing process of a paper (figure 
5b), the scientists’ needs and possibilities to reach out from a place of knowledge 
production in order to communicate and to mobilise new resources in different places 
vary considerably according to the constitutive entities at different stages of their 
work. This is because they deal to a varying extent with material and immaterial 
entities that imply different geographies respectively. In short, dealing primarily with 
material entities, such as the constitutive devices of the accelerator, may tie the 
researcher to a particular spatial setting, while immaterial entities such as knowledge, 
recorded data, calculations and arguments do not necessarily show any other physical 
manifestation than the corporeality of humans, computers, paper forms or other 
media, and thus they are as mobile as their physical vehicles allow them to be.  
Figure 5 about here 
Therefore, the suggested differentiation of material and immaterial actants may 
serve to conceptualise one particular way in which geography matters in the pursuit of 
science. The related conceptual move, however, raises the questions of how these two 
types of actants are tied together, and which role humans play within the 
heterogeneous networks of particle beams and knowledge claims, sub-atomic events 
and multinational collaborations, detectors, hopes and potential Nobel Prizes as 
encountered in the world of the RHIC community. 
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Latour developed his concept of ‘circulating reference’ between words and the 
world in order to expose two failures of the modernist settlement – the differentiation 
of two ontological domains of language and nature, and the search for correspondence 
over the huge gap that separates them. He argues that through the erasure of all the 
traceable connections between the object of knowledge (nature) and its representation 
(language) the two non-existing ontological domains and the separating gap of the 
modernist settlement came into existence (Latour 1999b: 73). According to Latour, 
however, ‘circulating reference’ is characterised by ‘a complete rupture at each stage 
between the “thing” part of each object and its “sign” part’ (Latour 1999b: 60). 
Hence, he illustrates the rupture with question marks, indicating that it is a complete 
mystery what happens during each transformation from matter to form (figure 5a).
6
 
While the answer to the question of what actually happens in such an individual 
transformation may indeed be a complete mystery, I think that there is no mystery at 
all about who does the transformation and thus bridges the presumed gaps between 
things and signs. This is because every gap between world and words is closed by 
practices and performances of what I propose to call ‘dynamic hybrids,’ i.e. beings 
that are able to negotiate between matter and meaning because their abilities are based 
on a dynamic combination of both realms. 
In the first instance, dynamic hybrids are humans such as the experimental high 
energy physicists. Combining the socio-materiality of humans and non-humans with 
the ability to deal with all sorts of mental and other immaterial entities, humans are 
able to transform matter into signs and to recognise the meaning of signs (figure 6). 
Understanding human actors as beings in which different types of actants are 
dynamically linked together and that, in turn, actively tie together other actants, it 
becomes obvious that their abilities, because of the combinational power, are 
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ultimately greater than those of singular immaterial and (socio)material actants. At 
least, this is true until the dynamic circulation between ontologically different 
components, which keeps us alive, ceases to exist, and we are reduced from human 
beings to non-dynamic socio-material matter. 
Figure 6 about here 
My second conceptual suggestion is, therefore, to differentiate between at least 
two meanings of hybridity in the context of actor-network thought: first, classical 
socio-material or historic hybridity in terms of a hybrid historicity resulting from the 
involvement or ‘socialisation’ of matter into human interaction. Second, dynamic 
hybridity understood as an extremely dynamic combination of different types of 
actants in the realms of matter and meaning that facilitates dynamic hybrids to 
actively negotiate between ontologically different elements and to establish lasting 
connections between them. Derived from Latour’s concept of circulating reference, 
this notion of dynamic hybridity is also intimately related to Henri Lefebvre’s concept 
of the ‘living body’ that he uses in order to underline the problematic nature of the 
subject-object polarity in social theory: ‘The living body, being at once “subject” and 
“object”, cannot tolerate such conceptual division’ (Lefebvre 1991: 407). 
Despite humans being the most complex dynamic hybrids in the known world, 
they are, however, not the only ones by far. On the one hand, humans are certainly not 
the only organisms on earth capable of producing and interpreting signs. In 
anthropology and geography, for example, recent works by Ingold (1988), Philo and 
Wilbert (2000) and Whatmore (2002) explore the constructions, knowledge, and 
consciousness of non-human animals and other non-human life forms, as well as the 
relationships between humans and non-human animals. Within ANT, however, other-
than-human organisms are lumped together with inanimate objects under the label 
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‘non-humans.’ This raises the question whether inanimate objects and other-than-
human organisms can in fact be treated equally when analysing network-building 
processes, or if this concept implies an unpropitious human-centred perspective, 
which ANT originally strived to overcome. 
On the other hand, following Donna Haraway (1997: 126-127), the argument 
that only organisms are sign interpreters may have been valid in the 1930s. As of the 
1990s this is no longer true as machines have been developed that are capable of 
communicating and interpreting signs too. This is particularly the case for 
contemporary technoscience in which scientists rely on sophisticated technologies 
such as supercomputers and accelerators when charting new intellectual and physical 
territory or maintaining close collaborations and widespread invisible colleges at a 
distance. The observation that human skills can increasingly be found among 
technical devices and often go much further in certain areas is not only underlined by 
the four detectors operating in the RHIC facility, but also by a broad range of 
literature on new technologies, artificial intelligence, Donna Haraway’s ‘cyborgs’ and 
new forms of artificial life which can be traced in different academic fields (see, for 
example, Turkle 1985; 1997; Haraway 1991; 1997; Hinchliffe 1996; Crang, Crang 
and May 1999).  
Accordingly, the notion of ‘dynamic hybrids’ comprises of humans, animals and 
other organisms as well as certain machines such as robots and computers. If running, 
the latter help scientists to extend their senses and skills considerably and to open up 
new spaces for scientific inquiry (the latest example being the Exploration Rovers that 
landed on the planet Mars in 2004). Although they are equipped with very different 
abilities, what all dynamic hybrids have in common is a continuous circulation 
providing a dynamic connection between their material, immaterial and dynamically 
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hybrid components and thus a greater scope of negotiation than non-dynamic actants 
can use for network-building. My third and final conceptual point is, therefore, to be 
aware of the difference between non-humans and non-human dynamic hybrids when 
trying to understand the geographies of network-building processes and to evaluate 
their chances and dangers.  
 
Sketching a complex trinity of actants 
As a result of the conceptual moves derived from exploring the geographies of 
technoscience, I would like to sketch a different concept of actants to the conceptual 
symmetry of humans and non-humans and suggest that this may better account for 
different scientific practices and their geographies. This trinity of temporarily 
differentiable actants identifies human beings alongside other organisms and certain 
technologies as dynamic mediators between material entities on the one hand and 
immaterial entities on the other hand, including their historically hybrid variations 
(the boundaries between those realms, however, become blurred when one tries to 
separate them accurately). Materialities, which always incorporate some kind of 
information (see, for example, Serres 1995), represent the world of matter, things and 
non-dynamic (socio)materialities. Immaterialities, which in turn are always embodied 
in some kind of physical vehicle (see, for example, Lakoff and Johnson 1999), 
incorporate the world of thoughts, imaginations, memories, feelings, (shared) 
meaning(s), concepts, social conventions, ideologies, instincts and the virtual reality.  
Figure 7 about here 
These three types of geographically relevant actants could be further sub-
classified, thus constituting a complex trinity of actants in which differences are rather 
gradual than substantial (figure 7). Building upon the concept of actants as outlined by 
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ANT, all types of actants can incorporate a historicity that could be ontologically 
hybrid and share the responsibility for further events. Nevertheless, the involvement 
of humans or other dynamic hybrids is indispensable for socialising materialities and 
materialising immaterialities. They are the agents that keep scientific network-
building going, thus producing knowledge as well as scientific histories, geographies 
and biographies. They are also responsible for creating new post-human and post-
natural realities that may one day be so well constructed that they start to dominate the 
human world, just as Nature seems to have constructed Humans that later dominated 
her realm – even if this does not have to be the case in terms of a teleological view as 
it has been criticized in recent debates on post-humanist thought (see, for example, 
Badmington 2004, Braun 2004, Castree and Nash 2004).  
Drawing upon actor-network based writings, the power-relations between 
humans, other organisms and technologies can be considered as gradually shifting in 
unpredictable ways. At this point in time, however, the use of certain mental 
constituents, especially the ones involved in scientific practice, and the related ability 
to enlist other entities for their purposes enable humans in many situations to build 
more powerful networks than organisms or machines can do. While this in fact makes 
the category of the ‘human’ very prominent in most conceptual accounts, including 
actor-network theory, it does not contradict the possibility of much more ambiguous 
power-relations when studying particular network configurations (see Whatmore 
1999: 28-29): 
The use of computers has opened some parts of our field that previously were 
just too difficult to calculate, and now computers are able to handle all these 
things. It still takes good ideas and unfortunately the use of computers is 
something that has plus and minus attached to it… I mean the ideas are crucial, 
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so a computer is important but it’s not the critical driving thing. In some other 
areas it’s essential – I would say for my experimental colleagues it’s completely 
critical. These very large experiments done at the modern laboratories … [have] 
so much information to be handled that it requires state of the art computing. 
[Interview 10] 
Finally, the suggested concept of a complex trinity of actants relates to the idea that 
the meaning of different types of actants for network-building processes substantially 
varies in time and space, thereby complicating the static picture given in figure 7 in at 
least two ways: In the historical dimension, the spectrum ranges from a dominance of 
materialities at the dawn of our universe – nicely illustrated by the case study on the 
attempt to (re-)create a quark-gluon plasma – to a growing significance of immaterial 
and virtual worlds in the age of the Internet. In the spatial dimension, however, 
variations can always be observed between individuals and groups of people, whose 
practices, while situated in culturally hardly transformed environments, are dominated 
by material concerns, and those, while primarily operating in culturally strongly 
transformed areas, are much more shaped by imaginations and symbolically charged 
socio-materialities. In the context of high energy physics, such variations in time and 
space have been identified in the changing meaning of (im-)materialities for different 
stages of scientific work as well as in the difference between participating researchers 
in the centres and the peripheries of large collaborative networks and those who are 
lacking the necessary material and immaterial resources to participate at all. 
 
Dynamic hybrids and the geographies of technoscience 27 
Conclusion 
In this period of what has been described as our emerging post-human and post-
natural worlds, research practices in the natural and technical sciences increasingly 
challenge conventional categories of social theory such as subject/object, 
nature/society and human/non-human. In this paper, I began with an investigation of 
conceptual resources that may be suited to account for these developments by 
applying a geographical perspective on scientific work and interaction and by 
discussing related empirical findings in the context of what Latour (1999b: 294) refers 
to as his conceptual bricolage on the reality of science and its studies. 
Based on an empirical case study in high energy physics, a constructive critical 
engagement with a conceptual debate between David Bloor and Bruno Latour and 
other comments on actor-network thought in science studies and geography, I argue 
that an actor-network based conceptualisation of scientific practice as a network-
building process between heterogeneous entities is crucial for understanding 
geographies of technoscience. Applying the perspective of geography to scientific 
practice and interaction, however, revealed that the binary terms of ANT’s proclaimed 
conceptual symmetry between humans and non-humans do not only imply some blind 
spots in the empirical analysis of actor-networks but also seem to be trapped by the 
Cartesian dualism that it originally strived to overcome.
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As a contribution to ongoing debates on (post-)humanism and related discourses 
on human-environment relations, I would like to propose for discussion the notion of 
‘dynamic hybrids’ as decisive nodes between the material and immaterial spaces of 
scientific practice and interaction and to suggest that the resulting complex ‘trinity of 
actants’ may provide conceptual resources that begin to overcome restrictions 
imposed by dualisms such as natural/social and human/non-human. While combining 
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poststructuralist thinking with the role of materialities and immaterialities for 
network-building processes, the proposed complex ‘trinity of actants’ extends the 
notion of an embodied mind to the corporeality of humans, other organisms and 
certain technologies and thus could be regarded as a conceptual synthesis of ongoing 
discussions in science studies and different branches of geography. 
Leading to an expansion of perspective and an increase in complexity, all three 
basic types of geographically significant actants should be taken seriously with regard 
to their potential effects. This implies that each of them could be used as a possible 
starting point for empirical analysis as much as for modifications and related political, 
socio-economic, organisational, technical or environmental change. Regarding the 
Bloor-Latour debate, the proposed conceptual resources may offer a possibility to 
integrate the foci of social constructivist and actor-network based understandings of 
the sciences. In the context of empirical science studies, they may provide the means 
for extending the notion of scientific practice as a network-building process between 
heterogeneous entities from technoscience to theoretical work and the humanities 
(Jöns 2003: 156-160). 
In the end, it is important to note that the proposed conceptual resources do not 
try to establish new stable boundaries in order to contribute to a deeper understanding 
of the technosciences and other empirical contexts that escape traditional 
understandings of nature and society, the human and the non-human, but to keep the 
categories we use in motion (Latour 2002: 21). Considering the scientists’ ambitious 
efforts to conquer domains conventionally designated to ‘God’ by re-modelling what 
comes close to our universe’s (probable) origins and by creating new types of 
(bio)technological beings, it seems that studying the geographies of scientific work 
and interaction in different academic fields may provide many more opportunities to 
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further engage with Bruno Latour’s question about possible links between the four 
conventional but increasingly problematic a priori categories of what he calls ‘the 
modernist settlement’ – namely Nature, Society, Mind and God (see also Latour 
1999b: 14): 
ANT is not a theory of the social, any more than it is a theory of the subject, or a 
theory of God, or a theory of nature. It is a theory of the space or fluids 
circulating in a non-modern situation. What type of connection can be 
established between those terms, other than the systematic modernist solution? 
This is, I think clearly the direction of what is ‘after’ ANT. (Latour 1999c: 22) 
 
Acknowledgments 
An earlier version of this paper was presented in the session ‘Post-human/post-natural 
geographies’ at the RGS-IBG Annual Conference 2003 in London. The conceptual 
parts owe much to inspiring discussions with Mike Heffernan. Since my first attempt 
to synthesise arguments of the Bloor-Latour debate, I also enjoyed supportive 
comments from and helpful conversations with Trevor Barnes, Michael Bravo, Tim 
Freytag, Bruno Latour, David Livingstone, Peter Meusburger, Richard Powell, Steven 
Shapin, Yvette Tristram, Alexander Vasudevan, Wolfgang Zierhofer and two 
anonymous referees. I am grateful to all of them for intellectually stimulating 
exchanges, to my intervieews for their time and support and to Noel Castree and 
Catherine Nash for inviting me to this theme issue. 
Dynamic hybrids and the geographies of technoscience 30 
Notes 
1  In particular, this body of work informed the conception of relational geographies 
(see, for example, Bingham 1996; Bingham and Thrift 2000; Murdoch 1997a; 1997b; 
Thrift 1999; Zierhofer 1997), discussions on the understanding of humans, nature and 
culture (see, for example, Castree 1995; Whatmore 1999; 2002; Zierhofer 1999; 
2002) and case studies in different empirical contexts such as science and technology 
studies (see, for example, Barnes 1998; Bravo 1999; Demeritt 1996; Hetherington and 
Law 2000; Hinchliffe 1996; Jöns 2003; Livingstone 1995) and economic geography 
(see, for example, Murdoch 1995; Jöns 2001). 
2  On ANT’s opposition to humanism, see, for example, Latour (1993: 136-138; 
1999b: 3, 17-19). For critical comments on the role of humans in ANT see, for 
example, Collins and Yearley (1992) and Pels (1996). Murdoch (1997a) and 
Whatmore (1999) discuss the ‘human’ in human geography within the context of 
ANT’s ‘anti-humanism.’ 
3  According to the ‘generalised principle of symmetry’ human and non-human 
actants can both have their own historicity, an ontologically hybrid status and a 
potential responsibility for further action. Although the symmetry principle refers to 
the ways in which analysis should proceed, it does not imply that the power-relations 
between different actants are equal or non-hierarchical (see Hetherington and Law 
2000; Hitchings 2003). 
4  In a collision, the matter will be heated to over a trillion degrees which is more than 
a billion times the temperature of the sun. If quark-gluon plasma is formed in a RHIC 
collision, it will last less than 10
-22
 seconds and due to the small size, the impact 
would not be larger than the impact of two mosquitoes colliding (BNL 2004). 
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5  In one of the first studies that contributed to the development of ANT, John Law 
(1986b) had identified two possibilities for establishing long-distance control. These 
correspond to the first two ways of communication just mentioned: ‘inscriptions’ and 
‘drilled bodies.’ Later on, actor-network based works concentrated on the role of 
inscriptions for network-building rather than examining both phenomena with the 
same intensity. 
6  Latour developed his concept of circulating reference by following earth scientists 
into the field. His example for such a transformation from matter to form refers to a 
pedologist who removes a clod from a sample in order to put it into a 
pedocomparator, where it represents a certain location and depth of the soil in 
question (Latour 1999b: 49f). 
7  This point first came up in discussions with Mike Heffernan. I am also grateful to 
Steven Shapin for emphasising this implication after the presentation of a different 
version of this paper at the Second International Symposium on Knowledge and 
Space in Heidelberg (September 2002). 
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Figure 1   Location of the detectors operating at the  
Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC).  
 
Source: BNL 2004, redrawn. 
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Figure 2   Participating institutions in high energy experiments  
a) RHIC 2001  
 
b) CERN 1999 
 
Data source: a) BNL 2001, b) CERN Greybook, lists of authors. 
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Figure 3   The symmetry of actants according to Latour (1999b). Author’s design. 
 
Figure 4   The asymmetry of actants implied in Latour (1999b). Author’s design. 
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Figure 5   a) Latour’s concept of ‘circulating reference.’ Source: Latour 1999b: 
71-73, redrawn and supplemented. b) Chains of transformation in 
RHIC experiments. Author’s design. 
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Figure 6 Humans as dynamic hybrids. Author’s design. 
 
Figure 7 A complex trinity of actants. Author’s design. 
 
